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Abstract 
The S & Marper judgement of the European Court of Human Rights addresses the 
question of D N A profile retention in the absence of conviction or admission of guilt. It 
casts the problem as a question of balancing the principles of individual privacy and 
public protection. In the Court's view there is a level of public protection conferred by 
retention of D N A from arrestees against whom no further action is taken which would 
justify retention, yet relevant data do not exist to determine the level of public protection 
gained by such retention. A pilot study is reported here showing that a group against 
whom arrest is followed by no further action exhibits levels of subsequent criminality 
(measured by frequency, latency and most severe outcome) similar to those of people 
officially processed by sentence or caution. Survival and count regression analyses 
suggest statistical approaches to be taken using larger and better samples. A research 
programme is outlined which would allow evidence-based policy on D N A profile 
retention. 
Introduction 
It has become routine in many jurisdictions to take D N A samples from people arrested or 
acquitted and /or proceeded with in the criminal justice system. For example, in England 
and Wales the D N A database in the Police National Computer (PNC) has risen by 40% in 
the last 2 years amounting to 5 million profiles. Just over one million belonged to people 
younger than 18 year olds at the time of retention (Significance 2009). 
The policy varies in different jurisdictions. It has generally been applied to sentenced 
adult offenders. Controversy has arisen in cases that D N A profiles of people arrested but 
not processed with (i.e., sentenced or cautioned) are retained, not least because of the 
prevailing surmise in Western legal systems that people not found or not having admitted 
guilt remain legally innocent. D N A profiles of suspects arrested for serious violent or 
sexual offences are retained for up to 5 years in Scotland and 12 years in England and 
Wales. England and Wales, unlike Scotland, also retains profiles of people arrested (but 
not admitted guilt or charged) for less serious crimes (up to 6 years) as well as those 
taken from arrestees under 18. 850,000 profiles in the above mentioned database are 
taken from those against whom no further action was taken at the time of D N A sampling 
(Significance 2009). Critics have argued that the D N A profile retention policy has no 
statutory basis or independent oversight and it is disproportionally used to create pre-
suspects among young ethnic minority males (Travis 2009, see also the last paragraph of 
this section). 
In the recent, 2008, and landmark case ofS&Marper1, the European Court of Human 
Rights held that the practice in England and Wales of retaining on the national database 
the D N A samples and profiles of people arrested, but where guilt was not subsequently 
established or admitted, should be discontinued. Currently held samples and profiles in 
such cases should be discarded. The Court's exact statement follows: 
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"1. In conclusion, the Court finds that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the 
powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons 
suspected but not convicted of offences, as applied in the case of the present applicants, 
fails to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that 
the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this 
regard." 
The judgement is couched primarily in terms of achieving a balance between two 
principles, setting the right of privacy of those arrested against public protection to be 
gained by retention. Defining and comparing the two competing principles has given rise 
to heated public debate in the U K and elsewhere. It has also initiated academic research, 
including the present work, and will undoubtedly continue to do so, not least because 
national policies on D N A retention are required to demonstrate maintaining the above 
balance, especially since the S & Marper judgement. If the European Court of Human 
Rights had decided that the bio-material privacy of those arrested but not found guilty 
was of utmost importance without due consideration to public protection, the debate 
would have ended there and this paper would have remained unwritten. 
The trade-off between public and private interests applies to evidence retention of all 
kinds. That D N A retention seems to be an issue of unparalleled sensitivity perhaps stems 
from the characterisation of D N A as providing a 'genetic blueprint', evoking 
recollections of the dark history of 20* century eugenics. It cannot stem from the 
particular importance of D N A evidence in miscarriages of justice (see Rossmo 2009). 
Confirmation bias among investigators, i.e., the tendency to find proving evidence of 
their own preconceptions and oversee evidence which disproves it, (Nickerson 1998) and 
eyewitness testimony (Marcus 2008) definitely, as well as fingerprint analysis (Dror and 
Fraser-Mackenzie 2009) potentially, contribute more to such miscarriages. In the USA, 
The Innocence Project attests to the ability of D N A evidence to exonerate innocent 
individuals who have nevertheless been convicted of an offence. The Project claims 235 
post-conviction D N A exculpations to date. Seventeen of those exculpated had been 
sentenced to death before D N A established their innocence. The average sentence length 
served by those exonerated was 12 years. Marcus (2008 p. 29) in what must be a 
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reference to the Innocence Project, asserts that over 90% of the overturned convictions 
had hinged on faulty eyewitness testimony. Nonetheless D N A retention was the central 
issue of contention on which the Court ruled in S & Marper, and hence is the focus of the 
present paper. 
The ways in which D N A sampling may compromise privacy rights have been addressed 
elsewhere (see for example the edited collection published as Lazer (2004); Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2007; Kimmelman 2000; Murphy 2007; Williams and Johnson 
2008 and McCartney 2006a,b) and will not be discussed further here. Less attention has 
been given to the public protection afforded by D N A retention. In the next section, 
evidence of such effects when the sampled population comprises adjusdicated offenders 
will be reviewed en passant. If there were no such effects, retention generally would be 
called into question. 
The Impact of DNA Usage 
The effect of D N A testing of all prisoners in New South Wales was assessed (Dunsmuir, 
et al. 2008). From January 2001 onwards, NSW Police tested inmates serving sentences 
for serious indictable offences in NSW prisons. D N A testing of inmates was associated 
with a subsequent significant increase in the clear-up and charge rate of most offence 
types, including sexual assault, robbery, and burglary. 
In a U K study with less detailed information, Alaster Smith (see also Burrows et al. 2005; 
Asplen 2004; Bradbury and Feist 2005) reported that: 
"Overall, the national (UK) detection rate for the police is 23% of recorded crime. When 
useable D N A is recovered and loaded onto the D N A database, this detection rate rises to 
43%)... .In domestic burglary... .the detection rate rises from 15 to 46%; theft from a 
vehicle rises from 7 to 61%>; and criminal damage increases from 13 to 52%."(Smith 
2004, p. 14). 
Roman et al. (2008, 2009) conducted a prospective randomised experiment of the cost-
effectiveness of D N A in investigating high-volume crimes. Five hundred crime scenes in 
five communities were studied and cases randomly assigned to treatment and control 
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conditions. D N A processing as well as traditional methods were used to investigate the 
cases in the treatment group. In the control group, biological evidence was not initially 
used, and case outcomes were due to traditional investigation. Property crime cases 
where D N A evidence was processed had more than twice as many suspects identified, 
twice as many arrested and more than twice as many cases accepted for prosecution 
compared with traditional investigation. 
An inadequately reported study is Chicago's 'Study on Preventable Crimes'. This 
claims, reporting a sample of only eight individuals, that 63 violent crimes (including 53 
murders and rapes) could have been prevented had D N A been sampled upon arrest rather 
than conviction.4 
The assessments of the effects of D N A usage are of course specific to a level of skill and 
effort deployed by crime scene examiners. A necessary piece of research would focus 
upon the overlooked issue of their skill and preferences, since there is reason to suppose 
that much forensic evidence is simply not captured. Unpublished material to support this 
contention is available from the second author on request. Research by Bond (2007) and 
Addedey and Bond (2008) suggests a means of maximising forensic detections, and 
notes a reduction in burglary where this was implemented. 
Some indirect effects of D N A retention in adjudicated cases should perhaps be mentioned 
as providing indirect public benefits. 
l.Cost. Stelfox (2006) estimated the cost of a murder at £1.46 million at 2003/04 prices. 
Al l murders by offenders beyond the point at which they could have been subject to 
successful DNA-facilitated prosecution thus represent cost and distress savings. By 
analogy, the argument applies to all other offences. Murder is an offence which is either 
cleared very quickly or only after a considerable period of time (Stelfox 2006). Savings 
in investigation costs can be achieved by swift clearance, to say nothing of reductions in 
putative further offending and attendant public disquiet. The opportunity cost of murder 
investigations is thus considerable. 
3
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 The judgement in S & Marper does not prohibit search of the D N A database against swabs taken upon 
arrest, so any prevention advantage would be retained after adherence to that judgement. What is at stake in 
the S & Marper judgement is the prompt downstream detection of cases. 
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2. Witness avoidance of court process. Guilty pleas induced by the existence of D N A 
evidence will avoid the trauma of court appearance and diminish the scope for witness 
intimidation, although the power of D N A evidence in driving pleas requires further 
research (see Briody 2002, 2004, 2006). 
3. Closure. Convictions afford emotional closure to victims and families. 
The Present Research 
The research reported here addresses the question of whether the subsequent criminality 
of arrestees against whom no further action was taken (hereinafter NFA-arrestees) is 
markedly different to the subsequent criminality of those cautioned or sentenced. If the 
subsequent criminality of NFA-arrestees is similar to (or greater than) the criminality of 
those officially processed, then a necessary (but not sufficient) criterion for retention of 
NFA-arrestee D N A samples on the grounds of public protection has been satisfied. 
The prognostic significance of D N A profiles taken from those arrested but against whom 
no consequent criminal justice action was dealt with in S & Marper as follows: 
"2. Lord Steyn also referred to statistical evidence from which it appeared that almost 
6,000 DNA profiles had been linked with crime-scene stain profiles which would have 
been destroyed under the former provisions fie arrestees with no further action]. The 
offences involved included 53 murders, 33 attempted murders, 94 rapes, 38 sexual 
offences, 63 aggravated burglaries and 56 cases involving the supply of controlled 
drugs." 
The Steyn figures are not very helpful. They may suggest that fifty-three murders is the 
total number detectable by retention of samples from NFA-arrestees. The Steyn numbers 
are time specific. If (for example) they refer to a two year period following arrest wherein 
fifty-three murders were linkable with NFA-arrestee DNA, is it the case that a four year 
period would yield 106 murders linkable with NFA-arrestee DNA? Probably not, because 
some arrestees would die, some would desist from serious criminality, and some would 
be incarcerated as a result of offences where D N A evidence was irrelevant. Nonetheless, 
the number of linkable murders would certainly be greater than 53! Put more generally, 
as time goes by, the number of crimes linked to NFA-arrestees (or any other group) will 
increase. By expressing statistics as a count rather than a rate, the erroneous impression is 
given that the Steyn figures represent the sum total of downstream DNA-detectable 
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crime. Recasting the numbers as a rate per sample taken, and cumulatively, would give a 
better impression of public protection forgone by deletion. Those most concerned with 
privacy will see this as a partial truth. Linkability of a D N A profile to a crime scene 
includes many cases where D N A information is irrelevant to subsequent detection. Set in 
the balance against that argument, there will be cases where imperfect examination of 
crime scenes leads to traces being overlooked which could have been matched with NFA-
arrestee profiles. In brief, fuller analysis of data of the kind used by Steyn would clarify 
levels of public protection associated with retention of the D N A of NFA-arrestees. The 
work reported here uses a different methodology and aspires to complement such an 
extended Steyn analysis. 
Data and Analysis 
Individuals arrested in Greater London from whom D N A samples were taken on three 
individual days, i.e., 1st June 2004, 1st June 2005 and 1st June 2006, form the sample of 
this study. The information provided in the data included offending history, subsequent 
arrests and criminal justice action taken up to 54 months after D N A was taken. 
Specifically, the respective risk periods for the 2006, 2005 and 2004 samples were 30, 42 
and 54 months. The data had been extracted by police analysts at the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS) which polices Greater London and provided the original data of this study. 
The data were anonymised when received by the second author. They underwent 
substantial editing to exclude those with earlier cautions or convictions and ambiguous 
cases. 
Table 1 describes the data and their attenuation as well as the distribution of offence 
types in respect of which D N A came to be sampled by year. The sub-samples from 2005 
and 2006 are more than double than that from 2004 (401 and 394 over 167 cases, 
respectively). The distribution of offences in the 2004 sample looks also different than 
that from other years. For instance, most individuals in the sample were arrested for 
violence and/ or possessing a weapon but this group is the second most frequent in 2004. 
On the 1st June of this year most arrests were for property crimes. Pairwise statistical 
comparisons partially confirmed the difference of the 2004 sub-sample. The 2004-2005 
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contrast did not reach the conventional level of significance (x = 5.97, at 4 degrees of 
freedom (hereinafter df), non significant (hereinafter ns)) but the 2004-2006 contrast did 
(X = 13.31, 4df, p-value<0.010). No reliable difference was found between 2005 and 
2006 (x2= 7.30, 4df, ns). 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Samples were compared with respect to the age of those sampled. There was a tendency 
for the samples to differ (F2,585 = 2.52, p-value = 0.081). Games-Howell post-hoc 
comparisons showed the tendency to differ to lie between the 2004 and 2006 samples. 
Table 2 shows what happened to arrestees after a D N A sample was taken. It should be 
borne in mind, when looking at analyses presented here, that the subsequent recorded 
criminality of the group given custodial sentences will be lower than it would have been 
had they been free to re-offend throughout the follow-up period. The comparison 
between NFA-arrestees and those given non-custodial sentences is thus more directly 
interpretable. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Tables 1 and 2 and the analysis by age suggest that the sample from 2004 significantly 
differs from that taken from the other two years. The percentage of NFA-arrestees 
increased from 28.3% (see first figure of Table 2) in 2004 to eventually 45.1%> (see third 
column and first row of figures in Table 2) in 2006 while the percentage of the other less 
severe disposals declined. Specifically, on 1st June 2006 warnings and non-custodial 
sentences were given to 27.7% and 13.6% of arrestees in Greater London, respectively, 
while on the same day of 2004 to respective 41.1% and 20.8% of arrestees. This may 
reflect a change in policing practice, whereby more and younger people were arrested, 
and for less serious offences, so as to exercise more widely the newly-acquired power to 
have their D N A profiles placed on the national database. This is however a question 
beyond the scope of the present study and is left for future research. 
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All ratings of subsequent events were made without the researcher knowing the rating of 
the offence triggering D N A sampling and the action which immediately followed (this is 
termed blind ranking). There was thus no possibility that notions of likely patterns might 
subtly influence interpretation. The post-DNA variables were: 
1. Number of subsequent separate dated events (leading to arrest, warning, 
conviction). Dates were taken as the unit of count to avoid the problems 
presented by numerous counts dated to the same day; 
2. Time (months) to first subsequent dated event; 
3. Whether any subsequent dated events involved violence, i.e., assault, or weapon 
possession; 
4. The most severe sanction imposed at the first subsequent dated event. 
The time (in months) to the first subsequent PNC appearance was analysed via life tables 
to estimate cumulative survival function and hazard rate. The cumulative survival 
function is an estimate of the proportion of the sample not re-arrested at the end of each 
interval given than they were not re-arrested in any previous interval. The hazard rate is 
the rate of rearrest within any interval given the number of individuals who have survived 
until that period (Lancaster 1990; Greene 1997). This paper contains a partial and 
abridged version of the relevant analyses. More detailed hazard and survival function 
information is available on the request from the first author. 
In short, all groups including the NFA arrestees reappeared in the PNC data after roughly 
the same interval during the follow up period when all years are examined together with 
appropriate censoring to account for the different follow up periods. The Wilcoxon test 
statistics of overall and pairwise comparisons were statistically non-significant. Thus, 
time to re-arrest described a similar time course for NFA-arrestees and others (see Figure 
1 below). 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
A statistical comparison of the median survival time and the cumulative survival and 
hazard functions showed that the N F A group from 2005 had a first subsequent PNC 
appearance sooner that those who were given a warning /caution (p-value of the 
Wilcoxon test statistic of pairwise comparison, henceforth W-test, = 0.11) or people in 
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the 'other action' category (W- test p-value = 0.10).5 Analyses of median survival times 
by action taken after D N A sampling clustered within offence type (i.e., property, 
violence/weapon, vehicle-linked, drug or other) which triggered the sample being taken 
are available from the first author. With respect to vehicle-linked offences the N F A group 
re-appeared in the PNC significantly sooner than those who received non-custodial 
sentences (W- test p-value = 0.01). By contrast, with respect to other offences they re-
appeared later than those given caution or warning. These analyses however do not 
modify the central conclusion, that NFA-arrestees are not to be distinguished by their 
subsequent lower criminality from those whose D N A retention would be unaffected by 
the S & Marper judgement. 
The discussion focuses now on the outcome of subsequent contact. The simplest way of 
presenting the data involves summing across years. This involves conflating different risk 
periods but gives an overview. 
<Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here> 
Table 3 summarises the proportion of those dealt with who re-appeared as arrestees in the 
data. Figure 2 shows the most severe subsequent process of N F A arrestees and others. 
Overall, the subsequent apparent criminality of the N F A group was on a par with those 
given non-custodial sentences and cautions (x test of the association presented as Figure 
2 equals 2.71, 5 df, ns). We need also to look at the proportion of those with subsequent 
contacts at which guilt was admitted or established, since repeated arrests with N F A 
might reflect police harassment. The N F A group proportion with subsequent admitted or 
established guilt (71%) was slightly higher than the figure for cautions (65%) and slightly 
lower than the group given non-custodial sentences (84%). Thus the downstream record 
of the NFA-arrestees seems not to be an artefact of police harassment leading to repeated 
N F A episodes. 
5
 Due to the small number of cases we believe that two - tailed significance test values up to roughly 0.10 
are worth mentioning. The reader may decide whether to take this as evidence or reject the respective null 
hypothesis. The authors are happy to share the details of the statistical analysis i f requested. 
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The proportion of those with subsequent offences involving violence or weapons 
possession was similar in the three groups (65%, 64% and 60% respectively for NFA, 
caution and non-custodial sanctions). Eleven of the N F A group had a custodial sentence 
imposed during the follow-up period. Given that errors of estimation will be magnified 
by multiplying figures to give a monthly total, the speculation is that some 330 of those 
N F A ' d over the course of a month in the Greater London area might have had a custodial 
sentence imposed during the follow-up period. 
Analyses of whether any subsequent incident entailed violence showed that those who 
commit violence in subsequent events have a first PNC appearance following D N A 
sampling sooner than others (W-test p-value =0.03) and this is so for members of the 
N F A group considered on its own. These results — details which are available from the 
first author — are only indicative: they examine the uncensored cases, that is, sample 
members who were rearrested, and naturally ignore censored observations which play a 
role in estimating survival times. Future analysis should account for time-dependent 
covariates. 
There seems to be a link between violence and repeat contacts in the follow up period for 
those re-arrested. Indeed three or more subsequent PNC appearances are significantly 
associated with at least one violence offence generally (x = 23.53, 2 df, p-value = 0.000) 
and, especially, with respect to the N F A group who re-appeared in the PNC data (x = 
15.10, 2 df, p-value = 0.001). NFA-arrestees with two or more subsequent appearances 
were re-arrested some 17 months sooner than those who appeared only once again during 
the study period (W-test p-value<0.001). 
For the sample as a whole, those rearrested were significantly younger than those not 
rearrested (t = 6.14, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). The key point for the present paper 
concerns whether the link between age and rearrest was different for NFA-arrestees. It 
was not statistically reliable (Fi;584= 0.03, ns). The relationship between age and rearrest 
was similar for NFA-arrestees as for groups where other actions were taken. The 
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importance of this result, if replicated on a larger scale, is that selective deletion of D N A 
profiles of younger arrestees is a bad idea in terms of public protection. 
The other candidate for selective deletion involves offence seriousness, with those 
arrested for less serious offences having their D N A profiles deleted. To address the point, 
the seriousness of the event leading to inclusion in the sample as an NFA-arrestee was 
ranked. The seriousness of the first subsequent dated event was also ranked. We thus had 
a before D N A and an after D N A ranking of seriousness of offences. The two rankings 
were undertaken without the researcher knowing which was the earlier and which the 
later set of events.6 The rankings were not correlated (tau = 0.08, ns). Thus seriousness 
of offence would be a poor basis for selective deletion of D N A profiles, since it would 
confer little by way of public protection from more serious offences. This chimes with 
unhappy Canadian experience (see House et al. 2006). 
Subsequent contact and severity of subsequent action are two aspects of a criminal career. 
Table 4 presents the estimated number of months to subsequent arrest by initial and most 
serious subsequent action taken. Since more persistent offenders return faster and are 
liable to more serious subsequent criminality, the results in this Table are not surprising. 
In particular, the N F A group at initial contact has very different survival times depending 
on the most severe outcome of subsequent contacts. Subsequent contact comes later (after 
13 months) when it leads to a second N F A than if the originally NFA-arrestee is 
eventually cautioned or sentenced. Indeed, within the N F A arrestee group, the time to 
subsequent arrest is significantly longer if the most severe subsequent action is again 
N F A than any other action (respective W-tests p-values < 0.05). The same caveat as for 
the previous analyses of violence and repeat arrests holds here: the analysis draws from 
the sample which was re-arrested. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
The effects of more than two covariates on the survival curve were examined via Cox 
regression models (Lancaster 1990). Results are available from the first author upon 
6
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request, but are excluded here because they do not compromise the simpler account given 
to this point. For example, the older the arrestee when the D N A sample was taken, the 
longer the time to his /her subsequent first rearrest, i.e., younger arrestees re-appear in the 
PNC data sooner than older ones. There was no statistically significant interaction effect 
of age with either number of, or any violence in, subsequent re-arrests. 
The number of subsequent PNC appearances was also modelled via negative binomial 
regression accounting for the different follow up periods across years in the sample. The 
results are shown in Table 5. Older arrestees are rearrested less often. There were no 
significant interactions between age and any subsequent violence for those rearrested. 
Running similar analyses with a larger sample would confirm whether the lack of 
interaction effects is real or an artefact of too few cases with each combination of 
characteristics. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
Discussion 
This section is unusual for a discussion section in referring to studies not mentioned in 
the introduction. The justification is that it was felt inappropriate to discuss some 
compromise retention policies until a provisional conclusion had been reached about the 
relative criminality of the NFA-arrestees and the officially processed groups. 
The NFA-arrestee group arguably comprises two types of people: the genuinely innocent 
and offenders who may be particularly skilled in witness and victim intimidation. In the 
latter case further police action would be fruitless since lack of cooperation would 
provide insufficient evidence for prosecution. This would make sense of the subsequent 
re-arrest and conviction history of the NFA-arrestees. In a study of Grievous Bodily 
Harm events, Belur and Wheal (2009) studied the factors which affect a victim's decision 
not to substantiate allegations. These included accounts such as: 
"/ did not know the guys who did it, but my friends did. I gave her my friends' 
names and 'tags' of the guy [who attacked me. The officer] called my friends, but 
all of them said, I don't know anything. The detective kept coming back but said 
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she had no evidence. How can that be, when it was 4pm in the afternoon and 
there were so many shops? I had given her as much information as I could, but 
none of my friends gave evidence. " 
Suggestions of witness intimidation were sparse in the data analysed here, but 
(subjectively) appeared exclusively among the NFA-arrestee group. If the 
characterisation of the NFA-arrestee groups set out above is correct, the question is 
whether the truly innocent in the group can reasonably be expected to carry their 
presence on the D N A database as a civic burden, borne in the cause of public protection 
generally. 
The present study is intended only as preliminary to a hoped-for research programme. 
The sample is from one police force area, Greater London, and areas vary widely in rates 
at which arrests are followed by no further action (between 4% and 36% in 2005). It 
comes from one calendar date, thus neglecting seasonal variation. That said, the 
conclusion is that the N F A group subsequently shows itself to be roughly as criminal as 
the groups with which it was compared. Exceptions do not generally suggest lower 
subsequent criminality of the N F A arrestees. 
Taken at face value, the data suggest that D N A profile retention confers no less per capita 
public protection than retention of profiles from cautioned and convicted groups. 
Selective deletion of profiles by age or offence seriousness would seriously compromise 
the level of public protection afforded by a retention policy, and in this respect the 
modest data analysed here are in line with the literature generally in its demonstration 
that early age of onset is a predictor of longer criminal careers (e.g., Piquero et al. 2004; 
Silver et al. 2000). 
The second alternative criterion for selective deletion is seriousness of offence involved 
at the point of first arrest. This rests upon an incorrect assumption of homogeneity within 
criminal careers (see Roach 2009). An earlier analysis showed that the offence which led 
to D N A being taken which led to detection of a subsequent murder case was most often a 
7
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drugs offence (in 29 cases), less often a theft offence (in 10 cases) and least often an 
offence of violence (Townsley et al. 2005). Selectively deleting D N A taken after drug or 
theft offences would thus lose the bulk of the evidentiary potential for the solution of 
murders. To illustrate the point, Stuart Cundy, Senior Investigating Officer in the murder 
of Sally Anne Bowman, asserted that "had a sample been placed on the national database 
after a theft offence committed in 2003, [we] could have identified Sally Anne's murderer 
within 24 hours. Instead it took nearly nine months before Mark Dixie was identified and 
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almost two and a half years for justice to be done." 
Finally, there are contextual issues to consider. The very different implications of 
retention of samples (the biological material itself) and profiles (their digitised 
representation) are conflated in the S & Marper judgement. If samples were discarded 
and profiles retained, legitimate concerns raised in the judgement about how 
developments in forensic genetics could compromise privacy would be negated. The 
judgement in consequence would be much shorter in length and the balance between the 
interests of individual privacy and public protection reconsidered. The crucial distinction 
between coding and non-coding D N A sequences and its implications for safeguards does 
not feature in the judgement. 
While properly absent from the judgement, the capacity of the police to work round the 
restrictions placed upon them by deletion of D N A samples should not be underestimated. 
Such 'work-arounds' are of two kinds. First, speculative searches of past crime scene 
samples will still be permitted under S & Marper. This would probably lead to less 
justified arrests for minor offences of those suspected of a serious crime (where a crime 
scene D N A sample is available) whose profiles have been deleted. There is a threshold of 
evidence which triggers arrest. That threshold will fall if a police officer believes there to 
be a chance that an arrest will lead to the clearance of a serious crime committed earlier. 
Second, forms of words in police intelligence records will develop to reflect the fact that 
a crime scene and criminal justice profile had previously matched, although the criminal 
8
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justice profile had been deleted. This would result in de facto retention of D N A 
information. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
More questions have surfaced than have been answered in the present research. This final 
section outlines some research priorities which may aid answering them. Having 
provisionally suggested that NFA-arrestees are subsequently as much likely to be 
sentenced or cautioned as others and that the two obvious forms of selective deletion of 
D N A profiles would lose much of the public protection potential of retention, the writers 
think that there is a case for an ambitious research programme. In the writers' view, it 
should attempt to investigate both the level of public protection conferred by the retention 
of D N A samples or profiles of NFA-arrestees and the extent of the public's demand for 
privacy of individual bio-metric information. 
To measure the former element a bigger and better replication of the study reported here, 
across forces across Europe is required. The sample sizes per force and /or country 
should be large enough to allow analysis by ethnicity in order to test whether the policy is 
disproportionately used to sample the D N A of ethnic minority young males, which is one 
of the main concerns voiced by critics. Ambiguities and other inaccuracies in the data 
should be clarified prior to analysis (perhaps with close collaboration of police analysts 
and researchers on the non-anonymised version) to avoid risking lack of 
representativeness. The suggested research programme should sample across time in 
order to identify trends allowing the separation of opportunistic arrest ('fishing 
expeditions') to enable placement of profiles on the database. It should also look at 
patterns across countries and forces sharing the same prosecutors, to disentangle the role 
of police and prosecutor in the decision not to proceed using a multilevel framework. 
The results of the above proposed analysis should stand to replication. For instance, Lord 
Steyn's evidence on the number of crimes cleared owning to D N A retention of NFA-
arrestees which is referred to in the S & Marper judgement (see third section) could be 
used to this effect if it is improved and expanded: The information should be updated and 
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extended to cover all forces and nations. As already mentioned, expressing the results 
cumulatively over time and/ or as a rate per N F A sample taken rather than counts would 
offer more insights about the public protection potential of D N A retention of NFA-
arrestees. 
A separate study to assess the deterrent effects of presence on D N A databases is at least 
needed to complete measuring the level of public protection conferred by the D N A 
retention of NFA- arrestees. This would be based on interviews with a representative 
sample of first time arrestees to assess perceived deterrence, as well as information of 
their subsequent actual and statistically assessed criminal record in order to compare the 
results between NFA-arrestees and other groups. 
The second principle in the balance entailed in the S & Marper judgement is the right to 
privacy of individual bio-metric information. The public's tolerance to violations of this 
right under perhaps specific conditions and circumstances should be assessed, not least 
because in democratic societies policies, especially expensive ones to the tax-payer, 
should fulfil respective legitimate societies' needs. This can be done via a public opinion 
survey of retention policy across Europe using appropriate survey methodology to 
investigate attitudes and perceived 'value' of non-market goods, such as the right to 
privacy. The survey would be repeated every two years or so to assess possible over time 
changes in the public sentiment with regards to this issue. Any ad hoc events which may 
markedly affect people's opinion of the legitimacy of D N A retention policies as well as 
the media's influence should not be overlooked. The samples would be large enough and 
representative in each country so as to allow reliable comparisons of the prevailing 
attitude towards D N A retention of NFA-arrestees across basic population sub-groups (for 
instance, by age, sex, ethnicity, educational level and employment status) and countries. 
Since the S & Marper judgement by the European Court of Human Rights states are 
obliged to demonstrate that their respective D N A retention policies achieve a balance 
between the right to privacy of those arrested and public protection. A necessary 
17 
prerequisite which seems so far to have been overlooked is reliable quantification of both 
principles so that their comparison becomes possible. 
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Table 1. Offence type in respect of which sample taken by year. 
Year 
Offence in respect to which D N A was 
sampled 
Property 
Violence/Weapon 
Vehicle-linked 
Drug 
Other 
Total analysed cases 
Excluded cases * 
Total cases in the Metropol 
Service D N A samples of 1st 
itan Police 
June 
2004 
48 
36 
22 
8 
6 
120 
47 
167 
2005 
79 
99 
31 
21 
14 
244 
157 
401 
2006 
62 
89 
30 
27 
27 
235 
159 
394 
Total 
189 
224 
83 
56 
47 
599 
363 
962 
* Note: Earlier cautions or convictions and ambiguous cases have been excluded from 
further analysis. 
Table 2: Action taken by year sampled. 
Year 
Action taken after D N A 
sampled 
No further action 
Warning 
Non-custodial 
Custodial 
Other 
Total 
X2 (degrees of freedom, p-
value) 
2004 
N (%) 
34 (28.3) 
50(41.7) 
25 (20.8) 
5 (4.2) 
6 (5.0) 
120 
2005 
N (%) 
108 (44.3) 
83 (34.0) 
29(11.9) 
11(4.5) 
13 (5.3) 
244 
2006 
N (%) 
106(45.1) 
65 (27.7) 
32(13.6) 
11 (4.7) 
21 (8.9) 
235 
Total 
N (%) 
248(41.4) 
198(33.1) 
86(14.4) 
27 (4.5) 
40 (6.7) 
599 
18.69(8,0.02) 
Table 3: Subsequent Police National Computer (PNC) appearance by action taken 
after DNA sampled. 
No further PNC 
Appearance 
Further PNC 
appearance 
Total 
Action taken after D N A sampled N (%) N (%) N 
No further action 
Caution 
Non-custodial sentence 
Custody 
Other 
Total 
140 (57%) 
105 (53%) 
49 (57%) 
16 (59%) 
23 (58%) 
333 
108 (43%) 
93 (47%) 
37 (43%) 
11(41%) 
17 (42%) 
266 
248 
198 
86 
27 
40 
599 
X (degrees of freedom, p-value) 0.68 (4, 0.95) 
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Table 4: Median time to subsequent Police National Computer (PNC) appearance 
by subsequent and initial actions. 
Action taken after D N A 
sampled 
No further action l 
Warning/caution 2 
Non-custodial sentence 
Custodial sentence 
Other 
Most serious action at subsequent 
Police National Computer 
appearances 
No further action 
Warning/caution 
Non-custodial sentence 
Custodial sentence 
Other 
No further action 
Warning/caution 
Non-custodial sentence 
Custodial sentence 
Other 
No further action 
Warning/caution 
Non-custodial sentence 
Custodial sentence 
No further action 
Non-custodial sentence 
Custodial sentence 
Other 
No further action 
Warning/caution 
Non-custodial sentence 
Custodial sentence 
Other 
Median Survival 
Time (Months) 
13.00 
7.50 
7.67 
11.17 
4.00 
17.00 
25.50 
11.50 
2.25 
5.50 
26.00 
5.75 
5.33 
15.00 
34.50 
12.00 
9.50 
14.50 
29.00 
4.75 
28.00 
1.75 
5.50 
1
 W-test values of overall comparisons of actions at subsequent PNC appearance within 
action taken after D N A sampled statistically significant at 0.001< p-value <0.05. 
W-test values of overall comparisons of actions at subsequent PNC appearance within 
action taken after D N A sampled statistically significant at p-value <0.001. 
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Figure 2: Most severe subsequent process for those with no further action (NFA) 
and those who were cautioned or sentenced (Others) after their DNA was sampled. 
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